In wireless networks, a watchdog mechanism can be a part of the security architecture used to identify nodes that fail to forward the packets they agree to forward. In this paper, we propose two protocols to address the ambiguous collision limitation of watchdogs. The Watchdog Alert (WA) and Watchdog Confirmation (WC) protocols are variants of the Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance Protocol (CSMA/CA). We analyse the trade-offs between throughput and watchdog success probability of each protocol, comparing it to CSMA/CA.
Introduction
In wireless networks, nodes may overhear the packet transmissions of other nodes in their vicinity due to the broadcast nature of the wireless channel. As a result, security of the wireless channel is of increasing interest. In ad hoc and sensor networks, where paths between a source and destination are multihop, this includes ensuring that a node forwards a packet identical to the one it received. A watchdog is a mechanism to assist a security protocol to identify misbehaving nodes in wireless networks (Marti et al., 2000) . Specifically, a watchdog is used to identify nodes that fail to forward the packets they agreed to forward. A watchdog operates in promiscuous mode, meaning that a node processes every packet -even those for which it is not the intended destination. This has been used to significant advantage in routing protocols, to keep up-to-date routes and repair routes in the Dynamicenergy. Such promiscuous mode operation has even been used in wired networks such as packet sniffers for passive network monitoring (Ptacek and Newsham, 1998) .
Our interest is to use promiscuous mode operation for wireless network security. The watchdog was introduced as a solution of node misbehaviour detection in Marti et al. (2000) and several security schemes have adopted it as a monitoring technique (Buchegger and Boudec, 2002; Kargl et al., 2004; Lee et al., 2004) . Security is required at all layers of the protocol stack. A watchdog could play a important role in enhancing the quality of security mechanisms in wireless networks. Enhancing the performance of detection or reducing false accusation has been considered at the network layer by Buchegger and Boudec (2002) and Kargl et al. (2004) . Since their ideas rely on a watchdog to collect security parameters, the reliability and accuracy of a watchdog could have a significant effect on the results of their algorithms.
In this paper, we propose two watchdog protocols to solve the ambiguous collision problem, preventing collisions at the watchdogs during monitoring. We take channel reliability into account for accuracy of watchdogging since channel unreliability contributes directly to monitoring error. One of these protocols guarantees the success of a watchdog mechanism in spite of channel unreliability. Hence, the detection of a misbehaviour in forwarding messages can accurately trigger suitable security actions in upper layers. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work examining the watchdog as a MAC layer mechanism.
In Section 2, we introduce the watchdog mechanism and its limitations. The Watchdog Alert (WA) and Watchdog Confirmation (WC) protocols solving the receiver collision problem are introduced in Section 3. Then we present the analysis of our protocols in Section 4. Finally, we conclude this work.
The watchdog and its limitations
Consider the wireless topology in Figure 1 in which node A has a packet to be forwarded through nodes B and C on its way to the destination. The purpose of a watchdog is to ensure that the node B forwards an exact copy of the packet it received from node A. Indeed in order for it to be successful, each time a packet is forwarded a watchdog must oversee the communication. A watchdog is a MAC layer mechanism implemented by maintaining a buffer of recently sent packets and comparing each overheard packet with packets in the buffer. If a match is found, the buffered packet is deleted since it has been forwarded. If a packet remains in the buffer 'too long', the watchdog increments a counter for the forwarding node. If the counter exceeds a threshold, the watchdog classifies the node as misbehaving and can report the classification up the protocol stack.
There are essentially two ways to select the watchdog. A sender watchdog is when a node forwarding a packet to a neighbour then monitors the transmission of its next hop destination. A neighbour watchdog is a node in range of both the transmitter and the receiver and can therefore overhear the transmission of each (e.g. node D in Figure 1 ). Throughout the rest of this paper we assume the use of a sender watchdog to avoid the overhead of watchdog selection. Marti et al. (2000) identified several weaknesses of watchdogs. These include weaknesses that arise from ambiguous and receiver collisions, the use of transmission power control, false accusation and collusion and rate limiting bandwidth through partial dropping of packets. We first overview each of these weaknesses. As Figure 2 shows, an ambiguous collision prevents a watchdog A from overhearing the transmission of node B if another node S transmits concurrently resulting in a collision at A. The ambiguity arises from the watchdog not being able to identify the nodes colliding and therefore it is unable to tell if B is misbehaving. Rather than occurring at the watchdog, a collision could instead occur at the next hop destination of the forwarding node. Figure 3 shows such a receiver collision; here the watchdog A overhears B forwarding the packet but is unable to determine if the packet is received correctly at C since C is out of its range. Therefore A is unable to determine whether B should retransmit the packet. With the use of transmission power control unidirectional links are more likely to arise. They may cause a watchdog to either incorrectly classify a node as misbehaving or to allow a node to deceive the watchdog. Figure 4 (a) shows the first case where the watchdog A is unaware that B has correctly forwarded the packet to C because the transmission range used to reach B does not include A. Figure 4(b) shows the more serious misbehaviour where B forwards the packet at a power level high enough to reach the watchdog but not high enough to reach the next hop destination. Some weaknesses manifest higher up in the protocol stack. For example, a malicious node can falsely accuse a legitimate node of misbehaviour. More sophisticated attacks occur when nodes collude; by working together, node B in Figure 2 may fail to report misbehaviour to A if it sees node C drop the packet. If a malicious node is aware of the threshold used by a watchdog to declare misbehaviour it can lower the rate at which it drops packets in order not to be detected; in this way, it reduces the bandwidth to the minimum. In this paper, we present two protocols to address the limitations of watchdogs at the MAC layer and the problems caused by channel unreliability. The protocols ensure that the detection of node misbehaviour is reliable. As a consequence, higher-level security mechanisms can then take a proper action.
Watchdog protocols
While a four-way handshake of a typical CSMA/CA protocol can solve receiver collisions, in order to solve ambiguous collisions we must prevent collisions at the watchdog overseeing a communication. We propose two protocols to solve ambiguous collisions for watchdogs. Suppose the source S is forwarding the packet it received from W to D. To achieve the goal in this case, all neighbours of the forwarding node S, its one-hop destination D and watchdog W must refrain from transmission during the forwarding. Figure 5 shows the floor of the communication. This floor is extended to include the transmission range of W compared to the usual four-way handshake. Clearly the watchdog itself must notify its neighbours whenever it monitors a forwarding. We propose two protocols to solve the ambiguous collision problem for watchdogs.
Watchdog alert protocol
One way to solve the ambiguous collision problem is to alter the handshake. In MACAW (Bharghavan et al., 1994) an additional Data-Sending (DS) control packet was introduced into the four-way handshake. The DS packet is sent by the source before sending a DATA packet to indicate a successful RTS/CTS exchange. If a neighbour of the source does not receive the DS and it has a packet to send to the source, the neighbour need not wait to transmit since the RTS/CTS exchange was incomplete. The DS packet may reduce delay.
In the WA protocol we use the DS packet of MACAW and introduce another control packet into the handshake. On receipt of the DS, the watchdog transmits a WA control packet. The duration field from the RTS packet is copied into the WA notifying the neighbours of the watchdog the length of the DATA transmission. This allows the neighbours of the watchdog to compute the duration of time for which they must refrain from transmission. The source S initiates the forwarding by transmitting a RTS to the destination D. If S receives a CTS from D then S transmits a DS packet. On receipt of the DS the watchdog transmits a WA to ensure that its neighbours do not interfere with W monitoring the forwarding of S. On receipt of the WA from W , the source now forwards the packet to D. The destination acknowledges receipt of the packet with an ACK.
While it is clear that such additional signalling solves the ambiguous collision problem, the watchdog may be outside the transmission range of the destination and hence may not overhear the ACK. To improve the reliability of the misbehaviour classification, we assume a node has two transmit power levels corresponding to transmission range of radius R and 2R as defined below. We consider this in the WC protocol.
Definition 1: (Regular transmit power:) With regular transmit power, a node is able to reach another node in a circular area of radius R.
Definition 2: (Full transmit power:) With full transmit power, a node is able to reach another node in a circular area of radius 2R.
Watchdog confirmation protocol
The WC protocol is based on an idea of Jung and Vaidya (2002) to transmit control and data packets at different transmit power levels. As we will see, this permits the watchdog to overhear the ACK by the destination and also to signal the source. Figures 8 and 9 show the operation of the WC protocol. As before, the source S is forwarding the packet it received from W to D. It initiates the forwarding by transmitting a RTS at regular transmit power (i.e. corresponding to transmission range R). The destination D responds with CTS, transmitting it at full transmit power (i.e. corresponding to transmission range 2R). This precludes the need for the DS packet since the watchdog is in range of the CTS. 1 The W-CTS is received by the neighbours of the watchdog, informing them to refrain from transmission for the duration of the forwarding.
2 The W-CTS is received by the destination D, confirming to D that a watchdog is monitoring the packet forwarding.
Receipt of the W-CTS causes the source S to initiate the packet forwarding; this need only occur at regular transmit power. Once the data is received at D, it transmits an ACK at full transmit power, informing both the source S and the watchdog W of successful receipt of the forwarded packet. The watchdog W now transmits a Watchdog-ACK (W-ACK) at full transmit power. This mutual confirmation assures monitoring of the forwarding to both the source and the destination.
Trade-offs between the watchdog protocols
Both the WA and the WC protocols solve the ambiguous and receiver collision problems, however various trade-offs exist Figure 9 Channel access in the WC protocol between them. The WA protocol only requires a transceiver with a single transmit power level. The watchdog W does not experience collisions and can therefore verify that the source S forwarded the same packet W transmitted to S. However, it cannot correctly ascertain receipt of the packet at the destination D and therefore cannot decide whether S must retransmit the packet. Only through the behaviour of S may W come to know the outcome of the forwarding. In the WC protocol, transmission of all but the RTS packet at full transmit power allows the watchdog to fully monitor the forwarding of the packet. But as we shall see, the cost is high, since the floor of the communication is significantly larger as a result. This reduces the concurrency in the network and naturally, there is a corresponding reduction in throughput.
Performance analysis
Using techniques similar to the performance analysis of Wang (2004) for CSMA/CA protocols we present an analysis of the WA and WC protocols. The throughput we derive here is defined as the ratio of the time that a node successfully transmits a data packet to the time spent in all states, that is, Throughput = Duration of data transmission Duration of all states In the sequel we model the node state to calculate the approximate throughput of the proposed protocols with numerical results from our analysis in Section 4.4.
Numerical analysis
In order to simplify the analysis we adopt a two-dimensional Poisson distribution with density λ, as the node distribution model of our protocols. Varying λ impacts the level of congestion within a region as well as the number of exposed and hidden terminals. In our network model, the probability p(i, S) of finding i nodes in an area of S is given by:
Since two different radio ranges are used the average number of nodes within circular regions of radius R and 2R are denoted by N 1 = λπ R 2 and N 2 = λπ4R 2 .
Similar to (Takagi and Kleinrock, 1984; Tobagi and Kleinrock, 1975; Wu and Varshney, 1999) we assume that each node follows a time-slotted mode to initiate a transmission independently in each time slot. This is justified since the performance of MAC protocols based on carrier sensing is much the same as the performance of their time-slotted counterparts in which the length of a timeslot equals one propagation delay (with the propagation delay assumed to be much smaller than the transmission time of data packets (Wang, 2004) ).
Let p be the probability that a node is ready to transmit in a time slot and p be the probability that a node transmits in a time slot. Assume that a node always tries to transmit a packet when the channel is sensed idle. Therefore,
We derive the throughput function of p . Notation that we use is summarised in Table 1 . 
Markov chain model
To obtain the throughput of each of the proposed protocols we must compute the probability that a node starts a successful six-way handshake in each slot. This requires that no nodes interfere with the watchdog as well as the source and destination during the handshake. Figure 10 shows the node state modelled by a three-state Markov chain. In the wait state, a node defers for other nodes or backs off. The duration of a node in the wait state T w is τ . When a node successfully completes a six-way handshake it transitions into the success state. In the WA protocol, the time to transition into this state is:
T s (WA) = rts + cts + ds + wa + data + ack + 6τ while in the WC protocol the time is:
T s (WC) = rts + cts + wcts + data + ack + wack + 6τ A node transitions to the failure state when the handshake is unsuccessful. The duration of the failure state duration in the WA protocol is:
T f (WA) = rts + cts + ds + wa + 4τ while for the WC protocol it is:
T f (WC) = rts + cts + wcts + 3τ 1 P 1 : Node x transmits in a time slot. P 1 = p .
2 P 2 : Node y does not transmit in the time slot. P 2 = (1 − p ).
3 P 3 : None of the nodes within A 1 of node x transmits in the same slot. For the WA protocol,
For the WC protocol P 3 (WC) = e −p N 2 is obtained similarly.
P (d):
In order for the six-way handshake to complete none of the nodes in the area W (d) can transmit for 23( rts + cts + ds + wa + 3) slots, assuming each protocol packet transmission time is 5τ . This is given by
Similarly, for the WC protocol, none of the nodes in the area H (d) can transmit for 17( rts + cts + wcts + 2) time slots is P 4 (WC) = e −p λH (d) (17) .
We now derive the transition probabilities of the Markov chain. P ww is the probability that node x remains in the wait state in a slot, that is, node x does not initiate a transmission and there is no node around it initiating a transmission. Therefore,
where N is N 1 for the WA protocol and N 2 for the WC protocol. Figure 11 Hidden area of node x for watchdog in WA protocol Figure 12 Hidden area of node x for watchdog in WC protocol
To transition from the wait into the success state, P ws all four probability conditions must be met. Therefore,
Given that each transmitter chooses any one of its neighbours with equal probability and that the average number of nodes within a region of radius R is proportional to R 2 , the probability density function of the distance d between node x and node y is
We normalise d with regard to R by setting R = 1. For the WA and WC protocols the transition probability is:
The probability of transitioning from the wait to the failure state P wf = 1 − P ww − P ws .
Denoting the steady-state probability of states wait, success and failure, respectively, by π w , π s , π f then:
where N is N 1 for the WA protocol and N 2 for the WC protocol.
The steady-state probability of the success state, π s , is the previously unknown quantity p s . Therefore, we can calculate the node throughput as
Probability of watchdog success
We define the probability of watchdog success as a performance metric of watchdog protocols.
Definition 3: (Watchdog success:) The packet received by the destination and the watchdog is identical. The probability of watchdog success P WS is dependent upon channel reliability and contention for the channel:
where P nc is the probability that no collision occurs at watchdog while it is monitoring packet forwarding and PER is the Packet Error Rate. In the channel reliability model the PER is typically derived with the hypothesis that errors are uniformly distributed in packets as 1 − (1 − BER) b , where b is packet length in bits and BER is the Bit Error Rate.
Watchdog success of CSMA/CA
As a benchmark, we derive the probability of watchdog success in the CSMA/CA protocol. In CSMA/CA, all neighbours of the watchdog (the shaded area in Figure 13 ) cannot transmit while the packet is being forwarded as this causes the watchdog to fail. Therefore P WS in CSMA/CA is P nc :
where q(t) = arccos(t) − t √ 1 − t 2 and P 4 is the probability that none of the nodes in the area W (d) transmits for ( rts + cts + data + 3) slots. 
Watchdog success of WA and WC protocols
The WA protocol prevents collision at watchdog by sending WA packet. Therefore, watchdog success of the WA protocol depends on channel reliability:
The WC protocol guarantees the success of watchdog by introducing WCTS and WACK packets. The protocol handshake cannot complete without watchdog success. Transmission of WACK packet is affected by the channel reliability. Since the WACK packet size is small the probability of WACK corruption is very low: P WS (WC) ≈ 1.
Numerical results
Figures 14 and 15 shows the throughput of the WA and WC protocols against that of CSMA/CA for different values of N and data packet lengths (100τ and 1000τ ). Note that the y scales for the two figures are different. For a given p value, the throughput of each protocol is distributed according to a normal distribution because at the extremes (p equal to 1 or 0) the probability of a node succeeding is approximately zero. Thus the maximum throughput can be calculated by adjusting p .
Since the WA and WC protocols are essentially a CSMA/CA protocol, the effect of data length on WA and WC is similar to that on CSMA/CA. When a data packet is longer than a control packet, the overhead of CSMA/CA and handshake is low. Therefore the throughput with long data packets (1000τ ) is higher than that with short data packets (100τ ). Clearly higher throughput is obtained when fewer nodes compete for the medium. The floor of the communication is much larger in the WC protocol than in the WA or CSMA/CA protocols; the access time of the WA and WC protocols is also longer than CSMA/CA since each exchanges two additional control packets. It is therefore no surprise that the throughput of the WA and the WC protocols is lower than CSMA/CA. Figures 16 and 17 show that the watchdog success probability of CSMA/CA is lower than the WA and WC protocols. The watchdog success probability of CSMA/CA is inversely proportional to p because the collision probability increases according to p . The size of data packet significantly impacts the watchdog success probability. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed WA and WC protocols to solve the ambiguous collision limitation of the watchdog mechanism. Both protocols are based on adaptation of the CSMA/CA four-way handshake, extending the floor of the communication to ensure the watchdog does not suffer inference while monitoring the forwarding of the packet. The WC protocol further ensures that the destination of the forwarding and the watchdog both receive the same packet. An analytical and numerical comparison of the WA and WC protocols to CSMA/CA shows that there is a trade-off between the watchdog success probability and throughput.
